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fold particularity by itself can in no sense be called material for science of any sort. If ethics is to cease being 'normative' and become purely 'scientific,' 'descriptive,' then it must follow the method of all 'descriptive' science. And this means that it must discover in its particular 'facts' the universal meaning by virtue of which alone the empirical datum becomes a fact significant for science. Dr. McConnell follows Schopenhauer and seeks to improve upon his master by amplifying the notion of the will-to-live. But Schopenhauer himself recognizes that, once we leave reason behind, science becomes impossible. Descriptive science aims at objective truth, at universally valid conclusions. Dr. McConnell's descriptive ethical science is doubtless descriptive of the way in which Dr. McConnell's own will to live the largest life functioned at the particular time and under the particular circumstances of writing his book. But it is not ethical science. The science of ethics demands, not the *Gegenüberstellung* of 'subjective' and 'objective,' 'descriptive' and 'normative,' 'will' and 'reason,' but the study of their interrelation and mutual significance in the one world of concrete reality.

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF.

New York City.

RELIGION AND IMMORTALITY. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911. Pp. vii, 87.

This is a little book, but full of great things. It has all the sincerity, charm, and depth of Mr. Dickinson's writings, and it deals with the most important concerns of life. In the main it might be described as a plea for 'the open door,' a plea the more weighty because the writer never allows himself to overstate his case. He feels intensely the connection between belief and action, a connection often thrust out of sight, but always present: he realizes, and makes us realize, that the old question, Is life worth living? is one that cannot be laughed aside, and that the answer, for rational creatures, depends on our hopes about the universe itself. But he is very careful not to say, "Therefore, since hope is so important, let us insist on taking a hopeful view of things, whether that view commends itself to our reason or not." He asks himself, it is true, what vision of hope it is that could make men feel it possible to accept life and all its fardels with con-

tent or joy, and his own answer is as definite as Browning's or Goethe's: "Western optimism, in my judgment, is doomed, unless we can believe that there is more significance in individual lives than appears upon the surface; that there is a destiny reserved for them more august than any to which they can attain in their life of threescore years and ten. On this point I can, of course, only speak my own conviction,—the conviction that, at the bottom of every human soul, even of those that deny it, there lurks the insatiate hunger for eternity; that we desire, in Browning's phrase, something that will

Make time break  
And let us pent-up creatures through  
Into eternity, our due;

and that nothing short of this will ever appear, in the long run, once men have begun to think and feel, to be a sufficient justification and apology for the life into which we are born" (p. 42).

But if this desire were shown to be baseless, if it were plain that there was indeed no such "justification and apology," our reason would have to face it and take the consequences. Mr. Dickinson is clear on this vital point, only he is clear also that we ought to think out what the consequences would be and not live, as many of us do now, by a faith which we deny with our lips or half ignore, to the detriment of practice and theory alike. To their detriment, because to turn aside from the Unknown, to refuse to speculate, however noble the motive, (and Mr. Dickinson recognizes the noble loyalty to truth which prompts the highest 'agnosticism,') is after all to cripple one's growth. "As I read man, he is a creature not finished, even approximately. . . . He is a being in process of creating himself. What he is not is more important than what he is; his divinations and guesses than his certainties; his imaginations than his facts. For him to tie himself down to what he knows and to ignore what he does not know, would be to commit a kind of suicide" (p. 5). It is quite possible, and here is perhaps the essence of the contention, that we have in us something which is "a first apprehension of some Reality," something which cannot yet fully grasp its own utterances, still less justify them to the understanding, and yet which is on the way to do this, is the pioneer to full knowledge; if only we can at once hold it fast and wrestle with it. Incessantly we should ask ourselves, What is at bottom the faith

we live by, and how far have we reason to think it also true? If personal immortality is desirable, we should never deny that desire, and we should search, deliberately and systematically, for all evidence on the matter, scientific as well as philosophic. If we believe in the value of human effort on the one hand and the inherent goodness of the universe on the other, we should take up again and criticise more closely than before the conception of the Absolute and the eternally Perfect. To Mr. Dickinson a Perfection that is compatible with the continued existence of evil as we have it now is a contradiction in terms, and would render our effort itself absurd. But one is tempted to ask: If the universe has a core of goodness that will more and more, *sub specie temporis*, triumph over and transform every evil, might not such a universe, in virtue of the end to which it is moving, be conceived, *sub specie æternitatis*, as itself absolutely perfect? The spring of all action Mr. Dickinson finds in the thirst for an absolute good which is to us not yet fully defined: certainly he will not identify it *sans phrase* with pleasure or pain: "If pleasure hampers it, I do not desire pleasure, if pain furthers it, I do desire pain." To the objection that this is to leave the ultimate good so undefined as to be meaningless, he would reply that the business of life is just to define it, and some of that business has been done already: we have discovered already some good things, and we believe there are "other and better beyond." And of these better he suggests that one at least might be the absorption of individual personality in a larger self yet not so as to lose its identity and consciousness, "included in a larger self without losing one's own self, so that one could say, 'I am somehow that self.'" This, as so much mysticism, strikes a distinctly Christian note, though Mr. Dickinson is strongly opposed to orthodox Christianity, and in connection with this there is an idea that may be worth throwing out. The figure of Christ has doubtless, as he says, lost its place for the thinking modern world, but is there not inexhaustible value in the Christian conception of a divine succoring power incarnated in one personality and overflowing into another? Is there an ultimate antithesis, after all, between Christ as "a power working mysteriously" in human beings, and Christ as "an inspiration and example, as other men also may be"? The bond is mysterious enough that unites us to other men, whoever they be, when in virtue of our relation to them we realize, even if

only now and again, that at bottom "we live by admiration, hope, and love."

London.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

THE DOMAIN OF BELIEF. By Henry John Coke. London: Macmillan & Co., 1910. Pp. 311.

The epistemological position of this book is that of Kant's "Critique of the Pure Reason," taken quite uncritically: We can only know phenomena. Scientific laws are not applicable beyond the range of 'possible experience.' Reason cannot transcend the phenomenal, but faith may do so. The objects of faith are freedom, immortality, and God, which conceptions and others connected with them are discussed in this book.

Mr. Coke does not follow Kant's methods of establishing these conceptions. Nor does he substitute for them any definite and consistent method of his own. He seems to do little more than to "consult the opinions of men entitled to be heard as recognized authorities." Many philosophers, poets, and scientific writers are consulted, but our author does not bring what he learned from them into a systematic unity. Had he even criticised their statements in a systematic way, he might have succeeded in defining more clearly the issues involved and thereby contributed to their future solution.

Most of the objections to the conceptions mentioned are considered and their force recognized. The force of some of them is found to be partly due to the unreasonable form in which the conceptions are held. God, *e. g.*, is believed to be the omnipotent Creator of the world. Now in view of the reckless cruelty displayed by Nature, it is impossible for a reasonable moral being to accept this doctrine. But if omnipotence be denied to God, and if creating or fashioning the world be "exclusively limited to the conversion of evil into good by the process of evolution," the belief in God is not unreasonable (pp. 159-162). His existence cannot, however, be proved by reason. "In order to justify belief we must, so to speak, take leave of our senses; these can only lead to a realism which is the mainstay of atheism. All reasoning is founded on an empirical basis; it must therefore be inadequate to the demonstration of that which surpasses this limit" (p. 153). And yet Mr. Coke's views regarding the attributes of God and His relation to the good and